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Abstract: This paper analyzes market share changes in automobile and light truck submarkets. 
We find that new product, as measured by restyling, represents the most consistent, dominant 
determinant of demand. On average a ten percent reduction in relative price would yield only 
one-tenth the market share impact of a restyling. Alternatively, one would have to double one’s 
relative advertising expenditures to match the impact of a restyling. Several demand 
determinants not previously modeled, including rebranding and warranty curtailments, were 
detrimental to domestic manufacturer market shares. Safety appliance adoptions and changes in 
vehicle reliability had minimal impact on demand.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Since 1996, the market share of domestic automotive producers has continued its secular 
decline falling from 72.9% in 1996 to 47.4 % in 2008 (Automotive News, 1997, 2009).  Several 
researchers have found that new product introduction affects significantly the market shares and 
financials of automotive producers.  Notable is the work of Pauwels, Silva-Risso, Srinivasan, and 
Hanssens (2004).  They investigated the impact that new product introductions and promotional 
incentives had on profits, total revenues, and market valuations of automotive firms.  While 
concluding that new product trumped incentives as a stimulant, they suggested several avenues 
for further research.  It is the purpose of this paper to extend their work in three important 
dimensions suggested by them. 
First, Pauwels et al. note that their data period “ … covers only a fraction of the history of 
the automobile industry…” (p. 154).  The time period of the present study more than doubles the 
model years observed.  Expanding the data set through the 2006 model year is significant 
because the expanded time frame encompasses a period of major product and non-product 
innovation.  Two examples of the latter include the introduction of decade-long powertrain 
warranties and 0% subvented financing for up to 60 months.  An example of major product 
innovation captured in the present paper is inclusion of the ‘crossover’, a segment whose 2009 
market share exceeds that of all truck- based SUV categories combined (Automotive News, 
2009). 
Second, they leave “… explanations of differences and effects across firms and 
categories for further studies.” (p154).  The present study analyzes the impact of 10 price and 
non- price determinants of demand by market class, by manufacturer, and by country of origin.  
Finally, they suggest that “… researchers might investigate consumer acceptance ratings that are 
available before launch…” that “… may help predict the performance impact of specific 
introductions.” (p.154).  The present paper addresses this issue by including consumer generated 
measures of vehicle quality and reliability which may influence market responses to new 
automotive product. 
In addition, this paper extends the work of Pauwels et al. by decomposing the effects of 
several variables that change simultaneously with product innovations.  Most importantly, a 
significant increase in advertising expenditures virtually always accompanies new product   2
introduction (Delre et al., 2007). In our data set, model year advertising expenditures almost 
double when firms introduce new products.  For instance, in the large car segment, when 
Chrysler replaced the Concorde with the Chrysler 300 for the 2005 model year, advertising 
expenditures on Chrysler’s large car entry increased by 400%.  Without advertising as an 
independent variable, one cannot ascertain whether the sevenfold increase in Chrysler’s unit 
sales between model years is a result of the new product introduction or increased advertising 
expenditures. Finally, this paper incorporates several variables, e.g., vehicle line rebranding and 
changes in warranty terms, which previous studies omitted in modeling automotive market 
demand.   
After controlling for a wide array of determinants of demand, we find that new product 
introduction has a major impact on demand.  From 1995 through 2006, restyling cycles averaged 
one year longer for domestic manufacturers then for foreign firms. This difference in styling 
activity better explains the 25.5 percent market share loss of domestic manufacturers over this 
period than more often cited factors such as reliability differentials as cited by Consumer 
Reports.  Interestingly, we find that warranty curtailments and vehicle line name changes, factors 
omitted in previous studies, importantly decrease demand for domestic manufacturers. 
The paper has five more sections.  Section 2 cites previous work in this area and provides 
a description of the model.  Section 3 contains a statement of our hypotheses and justifications 
for them.  Section 4 provides a brief summary of the data.  Section 5 reports the results.  Section 
6 concludes. 
 
2. Automotive Demand 
 
A large number of variables influence model year unit sales for a vehicle. We divide 
them into two groups: factors that we measure directly and those for which we control indirectly. 
The first group includes the relative price of the model and non-price determinants of demand: 
relative advertising, restyling, change of the model name, warranty, safety, quality/reliability, 
several forms of temporary price reductions, the number of competitors, and length of the model 
year. We control indirectly for macroeconomic conditions and market history. We summarize the 
demand for a vehicle as   
,, , ,, , , , 1 , ,, , , , (, , , , ,, ,, , , ; , , , ) it it it it it it it it it it it it it it t i t Q f P A RS NCH W S QR I R COM LEN P A M MST −− − = ,   3
where  1,..., iN =  denotes models,  1,..., tT = denotes model years,  , it Q denotes sales in a model 
year,  , it P denotes model year price of a vehicle while  , it P −  denotes competitors’ prices,  , it A  
denotes advertising while  , it A−  denotes competitors’ advertising,  , it RS  denotes styling,  it NCH  
denotes  a vehicle line’s name,  , it W  denotes warranty,  it S denotes safety appliance,   ,1 it QR −  
denotes observed relative quality/reliability with one year delay,  it I  denotes interest subvention, 
it R  denotes manufacturer cash incentives,  it LEN  denotes model year length,  it COM  denotes 
number of competitors,  t M denotes macroeconomic conditions that are common across the 
models, and  , it MST denotes market structure factors.  
 
2.1. Research Hypotheses 
 
The introduction of new product in a timely manner is a crucial component of 
maintaining competitive advantage (Carbonell and Rodriquez, 2006; Chang and Cho, 2008). We 
hypothesize that a styling change has a positive impact on demand and that the size of the impact 
increases with the extent of the styling change. The assumption that consumers desire innovation 
implies that the demand for restyled vehicles is higher. Previous studies by Kwoka (1993), 
Sherman and Hoffer (1971), Hoffer and Reilly (1984), Millner and Hoffer (1993), Purohit 
(1992), Berry, Levinson, and Pakes (1995), and more recently Nakata, Im, Park, and Ha (2006), 
as well as Train and Winston (2007) find evidence consistent with the positive impact of 
restyling on demand.   
We hypothesize that a name change has a positive effect on demand. If the current name 
equity is high, a name change is unlikely. If the current name capital is low, we expect a higher 
chance of a name change with a positive impact on demand.  However, a name change raises 
another hurdle for the new model introduction.  Not only must manufacturers educate consumers 
on the new vehicle’s attributes, but also what position the vehicle line takes among the make’s 
model offerings.   
We anticipate warranty improvement to have a positive effect on demand, while warranty 
curtailment to have a negative effect. Warranty improvements are a signal of improved vehicle 
quality and of lower maintenance costs. Warranty curtailments are just the opposite.    4
We expect the relationships between demand and changes in safety appliances to be 
ambiguous. On one hand, since higher safety levels are desirable, e.g., Boulding and Purohit 
(1996), we expect a positive relationship between market share and changes in levels of safety 
equipment. On the other hand, if the increase in price associated with added appliances exceeds 
the additional benefit, then vehicles with the appliances would be less desirable than their less-
equipped competitors. The relationship may differ by subclass. In the more expensive subclasses 
the same safety appliance will have a smaller percentage impact on price than in less expensive 
subclasses.  Recently, Pruitt and Hoffer (2004) could find no evidence that structural 
improvements, as reflected in better Insurance Institute for Highway Safety televised frontal 
crash test results, impacted market shares. Others (see Reilly and Hoffer[1983]) have 
consistently found little adverse sales impact from NHTSA-influenced recall campaigns.  
All else equal, consumers prefer higher quality, as measured by greater reliability. We 
expect our quality/reliability measure to move together with demand. We lag the quality measure 
because quantifiable information is generally not available until the subsequent model year. 
Sullivan (1998) concluded that the higher perceived quality of imported automobile brands, as 
measured by Consumer Union’s (CU) “Trouble Index”, translated into higher used vehicle 
N.A.D.A. book values than domestic branded twins. 
We include interest subventions and rebates in two ways. First, we measure price net of 
interest subventions and rebates. Therefore, price captures any stimulus that incentives generate 
by reducing the effective price faced by consumers. We also include measures of these two 
incentives directly as independent variables, to capture any impact that they might have 
independent of their effect on net price. 
The relationships between interest subventions, manufacturer cash incentives and 
demand, holding net price constant, are ambiguous. On one hand, the effects would be positive if 
consumers view interest subventions and cash incentives as temporary price reductions. On the 
other hand, dealers might not pass forward the full incentive value, mitigating the effect. Busse, 
et al (2006), using J.D. Power PIN data, estimated that dealers passed on to the consumer only 
30- 40 percent of the dollar value of manufacturer-to-dealer incentives. This compared to an 
estimated 70-90 percent pass through when manufacturers used direct consumer incentives. 
We hypothesize that own advertising has a positive impact on demand, while 
competitor’s advertising has a negative impact. A profit maximizing manufacturer will increase   5
advertising only when it stimulates demand. Kwoka (1993) found own advertising to be a 
significant demand determinant. Given the rivalrous nature of the industry, we anticipate that the 
majority of sales increases for the promoted model will be at the competitor’s expense. Indeed 
Kwoka (1993) reports that competitor advertising levels have an adverse impact on own sales.  
We hypothesize that own price has a negative impact on sales while competitors’ prices 
have a positive impact. The law of demand justifies our hypotheses about the effect of changes in 
own price. We expect competitors’ prices to vary directly with sales since this is an increase in 
the price of substitutes. McCarthy (1996) estimates a -0.87 the price elasticity of demand for 
automobiles in the U S market. 
To control the idiosyncratic effects of early or delayed model year introductions, we 
include the number of quarters in a given model year as an independent variable. Most model 
years cover a four-quarter period spanning two calendar years. However, model years can last a 
little as three quarters and as long as six quarters. Take Jeep, for example. The 1997 and 2006 
model year Cherokee and Commander, respectively, had three-quarter runs, while the 1996 
Cherokee had a five-quarter run and the 2004 Grand Cherokee had a six-quarter run. 
Finally, we measure entry and exit. As noted below, the dependent variable is market 
share growth. Therefore, we control for the number of competitors within a submarket.  It is 
more difficult to increase market share when entry is occurring and easier when exit occurs. 
 
2.2. Indirect Controls  
 
We control for macroeconomic factors by using market shares in a model’s submarket as 
the dependent variable instead of unit sales. Doing so indirectly controls for macroeconomic 
factors that affect all models in a submarket simultaneously. The list includes: changes in 
aggregate income, changes in motor fuel prices, or changes in tastes that make some submarkets 
more attractive than others in a given year. For example, the recent increase in the price of 
gasoline has reduced the demand for larger vehicles relative to smaller ones. However, the 
gasoline price increase would not affect market shares within a class of similar large cars.  
To control for differences in sales resulting from firms’ widely different positions of 
strength within a given submarket because their histories vary, we transform our data into growth 
rates. Some models have lower unit sales than others in their cohort due to limited distribution   6
channels and other unobserved institutional factors.  For example, consider the subcompact 
automobile market in which the buyer could choose between a Suzuki Forenza and a Toyota 
Corolla. Toyota has a dealer network that is three times the size and, on average, eight times 
larger than Suzuki (Automotive News 2009).  
 
2.3. Estimation  
 
Following Bresnahan (1981), we assume that the distribution of tastes yields a linear 
demand system. Consequently, we use Ordinary Least Squares to fit a linear model where market 
share growth is the dependent variable and the list of independent variables include: growth in 
relative prices, relative advertising, relative quality/reliability with a one year delay, model year 
length, and number of competitors, as well as, changes in styling, name plate, warranty, safety 
appliances, and manufacturer incentives. Note, by estimating the model in growth rates, we 
address the concerns that market shares, prices, and advertising may be highly autocorrelated or 
even non-stationary due to their slow movement over time.    
Since the price of the car enters not only the demand equation but also the supply 
equation, a natural question is whether price endogeneity is serious enough to bias single 
equation estimates. We find that a single equation model is appropriate. Neither Hausman nor 
Wu-Hausman endogeneity tests can reject the null hypothesis of exogenous price. To conduct the 
tests, for each model year, we take prices of vehicle lines offered by a manufacturer and estimate 
that component which is common across all lines. While changes in costs generally affect all 
lines simultaneously, such is rarely the case for changes in demand. Thus, the “common price 
factor” identifies price changes caused by cost.  Then, we instrument price by this common price 
factor and estimate the model using two-stage instrumental variable regression. The estimates are 
generally similar to the reported results. Our estimates of the common price factor, instrumental 
regressions, and Wu-Hausman tests are available upon request.  The last line of Tables 2-5 
reports the Hausman test statistics. The result is hardly surprising. Most manufacturers produce 
cars in adjacent market classes and must maintain price differentials between these classes. Also, 
the costs of manufacturing have been relatively stable over the time period covered (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2008). Thus, any supply shocks have been small.   7
To summarize, our estimation contributes to the literature by combining in a single model 
demand determinants that other studies find to be important individually, while adding new 
determinants, such as vehicle line rebranding.  Because many demand determinants often change 
simultaneously, our model addresses the omitted variable bias to a much greater degree than 
previous models.  
 
3. Data Summary 
 
Table 1 highlights the data. Data sources and definitions are available in the online 
Appendix. The number of vehicle lines (Panel A) ranges from 131 in the 1996 model year to a 
161 in 2004. Registrations vary from a low of 9.7 million, also in 1996, to a high of 12.9 million 
in 2000. Except for pausing in 2001-2003, nominal median vehicle price inclusive of 
manufacturer incentives rose from $19,488 in 1996, to $23,180 in 2006.  Except in 1999, 
domestic market share declined continuously, falling from 69 to 49 percent in our sample. 
Concurrently, Japanese market share almost doubled to 40 percent, Korean market share 
increased from 1 to 5 percent, and European market share rose to 7 percent, also almost 
doubling.  
Panel B summarizes the non-price demand determinants. The number of complete 
restylings ranges from a low 17 in 1996, to highs of 28 in the last two years. Partial restylings 
ranged from only three lines in 1996, to a high of 25 in 2005. A further examination shows that, 
on an annual basis, Japanese and Korean manufacturers restyled completely on average 33 
percent and 30 percent of their lines, respectively, compared to 24 percent for the ‘Detroit 3’.   
Warranty improvements and curtailments reflected, for the most part, changes made by 
Chrysler and VW since the 2000 model year. Quality changes measured by changes in Consumer 
Union’s “reliability index” impacted on average approximately 40 percent of the vehicle lines in 
a given model year, with 28 percent more downgrades than upgrades over the period. 
Manufacturers tended to distribute safety appliance adoptions evenly over the model years, while 
GM concentrated deletions in 2003, when it deleted previously standard antilock brakes and side 
airbags on many base models. Rebrandings numbered fewer than ten in every model year except 
2006. Finally, advertising expenditures in nominal dollars increased in virtually every model 
year.   8
While multicollinearity is not a problem in our data set, correlations between several of 
our key variables are high enough that if omitted could cause the omitted variable bias. The 
correlation between most of our demand determinants is below 10%. Further, the Belsley, Kuh, 
and Welsch (1980) collinearity diagnostics do not indicate a potential for multicollinearity. The 
scaled conditional number, 3.25, is substantially below the 10-30 threshold suggested by them. 
However, a few of our demand determinants have higher than 10% correlations. For instance, the 
correlation coefficient between advertising expenditures and complete restyling is 34%. The 
correlations and collinearity diagnostics tables (Tables 4-6) are available in the online Appendix.  
4. Results 
 
The positive impact of a restyling dominates the other determinants of demand and 
accounts for the secular decline in domestic market share. A complete restyling on average has a 
ten times greater impact on market share growth rate than even a 10 percent reduction in relative 
price.  Furthermore, manufacturers would have to double relative advertising expenditures to 
achieve an effect comparable to a complete restyling. Of changes in warranty, quality, safety, 
and branding, only rebranding rivals the positive restyling impact. Note that our model fits the 
data reasonably well, on average explaining over 40 percent of the variation in market share 
growth. 
Tables 2-5 contain estimates of a baseline model. Our dependent variable is the growth 
rate of the vehicle’s market share within its market class.  The first column in each table lists the 
independent variables. The other columns list OLS estimated coefficients for various subsets of 
the data; the first row indicates the subset’s name. Since our dataset includes most vehicle 
registrations, one can interpret our estimates as the 1995-2006 population averages.  We report 
standard errors in parenthesis and use standard notation to indicate coefficients that are 
significantly different from zero: under one percent (***), five percent (**), and ten percent (*) 
significance levels. The last four rows report the number of observations, the adjusted R2, the 
Durbin-Watson, and the Hausman statistics for each subset.              
 
4.1. Pooled Results 
   9
Table 2 illustrates the dominant impact of new product, as captured by our styling change 
variable. It shows the estimates of the coefficients for the entire data set, as well as the car and 
light truck markets separately.  A complete restyling on average yields a 19.78 percent increase 
in market share growth rate for that model year. Restyling elasticity is positive and statistically 
significant across all three markets.  
The effect of restyling is large if we compare it to price or advertising changes. A 10 
percent price decrease (90 percent of relative price decreases were less than that) leads to a 2.1 
percent increase in market share growth rate (-.21*-10=2.1) – one tenth of the restyling effect 
(19.78). Similarly, manufacturers would have to increase relative advertising share by 100 
percent (73 percent of relative advertising increases fell short of that) (0.15*100 = 15%) to 
achieve an effect comparable to a restyling. The size of the complete restyling coefficient 
suggests that new product introductions (restyling) may provide a better explanation of declining 
domestic manufacturer market shares than more commonly attributed variables such as product 
quality. 
Restyling has a bigger impact in the car market than in the light truck market, where the 
base fleet demand is greater. The restyling elasticity for cars, 23.43, is almost twice larger than 
for trucks, 11.95. Restyling has a multiyear pay back, for a complete restyling has virtually the 
same impact on own market share growth in the second year, as in the first. In fact, in the light 
truck market, restyling has a larger impact on market share growth in the second year than it does 
in the initial year. By the third year, however, the restyling impact on own market share growth 
has been spent.  
To a lesser degree, consumer markets respond favorably to a partial restyling.  The 
market impact of a partial restyling is of a shorter duration, lasting only one model year. In the 
pooled market, a partial restyling on average yields a 10.71 percent increase in market share 
growth rate. It is significant at the one percent level. But, in the model year after a partial 
restyling, the impact virtually evaporates, falling to 0.53 per cent, and ceases to be statistically 
significant. The results are similar for the cars and trucks subsets.  
Warranty term changes showed large and statistically significant impact on market share 
growth, particularly curtailments. For the pooled market, the decision to curtail one’s warranty 
terms, on average, results in a 24.88 percent decline in one’s market share growth, with the 
coefficient being significant. Given that previous studies, for example Sullivan (1998), find no   10
evidence that differences in warranties were a demand determinant, we find it surprising to 
discover such a large effect.   
Unlike warranty curtailments, manufacturers tend to introduce improvements well into 
the model year.  Consequently, the mid-model year enhancements have a lesser impact. For 
example, Chrysler’s warranty enhancements in 2001, 2002, and 2007, were all intra-model year 
changes.  
Consumer Reports quality ratings have little impact on market share growth. What 
impact we find is in the automobile market, where a one percent increase in the CU quality index 
results in a 0.07 percent increase in market share growth rate the following model year. We need 
to interpret this coefficient with care.  For example, if the median reliability value for the 
submarket is three,  an improvement in the CU vehicle rating from three to four is equivalent to a 
33 percent index increase; thus, market share growth increases by 2.31 (0.07*33) percent.  CU’s 
general negativity to light trucks and the demographics of its readership base may explain the 
complete absence of any Consumer Reports impact in truck markets.   
The coefficient of our “safety frontier” appliance variable carried the wrong sign, but was 
insignificant.  Both car and truck vehicle lines that adopted advanced safety appliances actually 
had declines in market share growth rate.  Safety appliance deletions yield a negative, though 
again, statistically insignificant effect on market share growth in both the automobile and truck 
submarkets. Virtually every safety appliance deletion emanated from the GM decision to make 
optional antilock brakes and side airbags on a number of its lines in the early 2000’s.   
The small and not statistically significant effect of changes in quality and safety are 
somewhat surprising given the recent media attention to these issues. In recent years, Consumers 
Union has made its quality rankings readily available to the broader media, for example, USA 
Today (1996-2008) or NBC Nightly News (2000-2008). With respect to safety, since 1995 the 
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, the research and policy promotion arm of the automotive 
insurance industry has become more visible in the broader media, for example, the NBC news 
magazine, “Dateline”.  
The coefficient of the name change variable is negative and insignificant. However, as 
we report below, the name change variable is a statistically significant negative determinant of 
domestic market share.    11
Vehicle line advertising expenditures are the most consistent, statistically significant 
determinant of own market share growth rate.  For the pooled data set, a one percent increase in 
own advertising expenditures, relative to the competitive cohort, yields a 0.15 percent increase in 
market share growth. The relative advertising elasticity (we use “elasticity” loosely as our left 
hand side variable is market share growth rate, not quantity) is comparable in both the car and 
light truck markets. 
The relative price elasticity is negative for the pooled and automobile markets.  For the 
pooled data set, a one percent increase in relative price yields a 0.21 percent decline in market 
share growth. Compared to the pooled market, the car market is more competitive. A one per 
cent increase in relative price yields a 0.38 percent decline in market share growth rate. Also the 
car market relative price elasticity is statistically significant. In the truck market, relative price 
elasticity is positive and not statistically significant. A large portion of truck sales represents 
fleets. Since ‘corporate’ negotiates prices in these markets, our price variable is less 
representative.  The cash rebate and interest rate subvention coefficients are often negative and 
statistically insignificant suggesting that incentives do not have additional impact beyond that 
captured in relative price.  
The market structure controls carried the expected signs. Market share growth rate is a 
positive function of the length of the model year in terms of quarters, and a negative function of 
the number of competitive vehicles within the submarket.  
Finally, we find that keeping the status quo reduces one’s market share growth. Status 
quo implies no change in relative prices, advertising share, and other non-price determinants of 
demand. When this is the case, the constant in our regression determines average market share 
growth. A negative, statistically significant constant means that market share growth rate 
declines if the manufacturer follows a status quo policy.   
 
4.2. Results by Country of Origin        
 
Over our observation period, vehicles from American and Japanese based manufacturers 
represented over 90 percent of vehicle registrations in the U.S. market.  Table 3 shows the 
coefficient estimates when we group the data by country of origin. Columns 2 and 3 show the 
coefficients for the U.S. and Japan, respectively.   12
A complete restyling has a similar impact on market share for both domestic and 
Japanese manufacturers. For domestic manufacturers a complete restyling yields an 18.21 
percent increase in market share growth. For Japanese manufacturers, a complete restyling yields 
a similar 19.81 percent increase in market share growth.  In both markets market share growth 
rates continues to rise in the year after a complete restyling, with the coefficients remaining 
significant at the one percent significance level. In the second year of the restyling cycle, market 
share growth rate for domestic manufacturers increases by 14.54 percent (22.44 percent for 
Japanese firms).  
Restyling alone provides insight as to why domestic market shares have continued their 
secular decline.  While the market share growth rate “bumps” from complete restylings are 
similar for domestic and Japanese manufacturers, the greater frequency of restyling activity by 
the latter has a sizable impact on market share trends.  To illustrate, we take a simple model 
where only the constant determines market share growth, as well as current and lagged complete 
restylings.  Note that over the 1995-2006 model years, Japanese manufacturers on average 
restyled every third year, compared to every four for domestic manufacturers.  Using these 
restyling cycles and our estimates of the constant and the coefficients on current and lagged 
complete restyling, we can predict market share growth rates from the beginning of our 
observation period to the present. In 1996 domestic and Japanese market shares were 72.9 and 
22.7 percent, respectively. As of January 2009, the domestic market share had declined to 47.5 
percent, while the Japanese had risen to 39.5.  From restyling alone, our predicted 2008 market 
shares of 47.9 percent and 39.7 percent virtually coincide with the observed ones. Our results 
build on those of Kim and Haan (1996), who found that the Japanese dummy was a highly 
significant market share determinant in the subcompact market over 1982-87.  
The partial restyling coefficients are also positive and statistically significant for both 
domestic and Japanese manufacturers, with the impact for domestic manufacturers being slightly 
higher. Domestic manufacturers restyle less often; thus, a greater consumer reaction to even a 
partial restyling. However, in neither market does a partial restyling carry forward to a second 
year. The shorter impact of a partial restyling is consistent with Millner and Hoffer’s (1993) 
results for an earlier time period.       
Over the last 15 years, Korean manufacturers’ share of the U.S. market quintupled from 1 
percent in 1996 to 5 percent in 2006. Much of the credit for this over five-fold increase has been   13
attributed to their restyling activity, lengthened warranty programs, and improved quality. 
(Consumer Reports, 2004, 50-51).  Our estimates confirm this conventional wisdom.  Even with 
relatively few observations for Korea, we find a large and statistically significant effect of a 
restyling. Market share growth on average increases by 38.88 percent in the year following a 
restyling. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level. After 
adopting a 10 year, 100,000 mile powertrain warranty program, market share growth on average 
increased by 27.9 percent. Quality improvements on average raised market share growth by 6.5 
percent. However, due to few observations neither warranty nor quality changes were 
statistically significant.     
For U.S. and Japanese firms, the coefficient of the CU quality index is close to zero.  For 
European firms, quality improvements on average raised market share growth by 4 percent. The 
impact is statistically significant. This result reflects CU’s readership demographics and the 
maintenance cost exposure associated with European vehicle lines, given that, except for 
Volkswagen, they are virtually all luxury or near luxury models.   
Compared to others, for U.S. manufacturers, the average effect of a nameplate change is 
strikingly different.  For domestic lines, a rebranding leads to a large and statistically significant 
decline in market share growth rate. It declines by 22.22 percent, and does not rebound in the 
subsequent model year as the coefficient of the lagged rebranding variable is small and not 
statistically significant.  American manufacturers may be underestimating the goodwill or brand 
name capital in their existing nameplates. At a minimum, they are underestimating the efforts 
needed to launch a new brand. By contrast, for manufacturers from other countries, in a 
rebranding year market share growth increases by about 20 percent.  However, none of the 
coefficients are statistically significant.  
 
4.3. Results by Manufacturer        
 
As Table 4 shows, a complete restyling, particularly lagged a model year is consistently 
strong across most manufacturers. We have separate columns for each of the six major firms 
selling light vehicles in the U.S. market.  Because of fewer vehicle lines, we combine the smaller 
Japanese manufacturers and all European manufacturers.     14
A partial restyling is most effective for domestic manufacturers. As shown in columns 2-
4, the coefficient of the partial restyling variable is significant for each of the Detroit Three. The 
partial restyling coefficient is particularly large for Chrysler. On average a partial restyling 
increases Chrysler’s market share growth rate by 36.65 percent. A partial restyling has a stronger 
impact on Chrysler because its minivan and Jeep vehicle lines tend to have longer restyling 
cycles, changes being constrained by functionality. With the exception of Toyota, a partial 
restyling has a lower impact on both Japanese and European firms. We attribute this smaller 
effect to more subtle exterior changes.  
Only two domestic manufacturers, GM and Chrysler, curtailed their warranties over our 
observation period.  Curtailments had a large and negative effect on market shares for both. A 
warranty curtailment decreased market share growth rate by more than 25 percent for each firm.  
Interestingly, after 2006, both Chrysler and GM strengthened their warranties likely in response 
to decreases in market shares reported here. Other results in Table 4 are similar to those in Tables 
2 and 3. 
  
4.4. Results by Market Class 
 
As Table 5 shows, for every market class except two, near luxury/luxury and minivan, 
the lagged impact on market share of a complete restyling is stronger than the immediate impact. 
Hoffer and Milner (1993) report the opposite for automobiles. They found the immediate impact 
to be stronger than the lagged impact. Production constraints explain the greater carryover effect 
of a restyling during 1995-2006. Prior to the mid-1990’s, manufacturers produced most 
automobile lines in multiple plants. More recently, few automobile lines have had more than one 
final assembly plant. The lower production capacity per vehicle line has constrained 
manufacturer response to the increased demand in the immediate year, carrying over demand to 
the following year.  In the near luxury/luxury and minivan market classes, however, 
manufacturers could meet within the model year the increased demand generated by a restyling. 
A single plant producing near luxury/luxury cars has greater excess capacity due to lower 
volumes, while manufacturers tended to source minivans from multiple plants.  
The strongest impact of a favorable CU recommendation in any submarket examined in 
this paper occurs in the traditionally-sized car segments. For the large-midsize-compact segment,   15
a positive recommendation on average increases market share growth rate by 3.6 (.11*33) 
percent. For the near luxury-luxury segment a positive recommendation on average increases 
market share growth by 2.3 (.07*33) percent. Both coefficients are statistically significant. The 
strong impact reflects that these market classes are disproportionately the choice of more mature 
individuals, CU’s core subscription base. Other results in Table 5 are similar to those in Tables 2, 
3, and 4. 
 
5. Discussion  
 
This paper has extended Pauwels et al. in four directions.  First, the time period of the 
present study more than doubles the model years previously observed, allowing us to study the 
impact of additional product and non-product innovations. In particular, we show that for 
domestic manufacturers rebranding and curtailment of long-term powertrain warranties has had a 
detrimental effect on market shares.  Second, after examining the impact of restylings by market 
class, by manufacturer, and by country of origin, we found that restyling is uniformly the most 
powerful determinant of market share growth. Third, we incorporate ex-ante measures of 
consumer perceptions. Generally, consumer perceptions, as measured by the CU “reliability 
index,” impact market share primarily in automotive subclasses where the consumer 
demographics more closely reflect the demographics of the CU readership base. Fourth, we 
separated the effects of restylings from increases in advertising expenditures, which on average 
double with vehicle restylings.  Even after controlling for increased advertising expenditures, as 
well as changes in other demand determinants, restyling remains the most important determinant 
of market share growth; manufacturers would have to double relative advertising expenditures to 
match the impact of a restyling.   
This paper began by questioning “Why the precipitous decline in domestic market 
share?” Finding that restyling is the most important demand stimulus, we conclude that domestic 
manufacturers have been “outproducted.” Over the 1995-2006 model years, Japanese 
manufacturers on average restyled every third year, compared to every four for domestics. Thus, 
in only one year of the styling cycle did the average Japanese model not have a styling stimulus, 
while domestic models on average enjoyed a styling stimulus for only one-half of their   16
showroom life. Interestingly, fifty years earlier, Menge (1962) similarly concluded that The Big 
Three’s more frequent restylings drove from the market the Post-War independent American 
automobile manufacturers (Hudson, Kaiser, Packard, …).  
Why have not the domestic manufacturers restyled their lines more frequently? The 
increased fragmentation or Balkanization of the domestic automobile market combined with 
management misallocation of styling resources may provide insight. Since 1960, domestic 
manufacturers have introduced multiple lines within the same make. Also they have spread 
restyling budgets uniformly across model lines. Such a policy has limited the resources available 
for restyling higher volume lines.      
To illustrate, consider the 1956-1965 decade. Between 1956 and 1959, Chevrolet had one 
model-line (excluding on average 7000 Corvettes annually), the standard Chevrolet, producing 
approximately 1.4 million units annually.  By the end of the decade, Chevrolet produced 
approximately 2.2 million vehicles under four nameplates, with the standard Chevrolet 
accounting for 1.5 million. In every model-year of that decade, the standard Chevrolet underwent 
a complete restyling.   
Fast forward four decades to 1996-2005, a decade which saw Chevrolet market 
automobiles under 14 nameplates. Chevrolet restyled its highest volume model-line, the 
Lumina/Impala, once. The remaining restyling resources went to lower-volume lines.  In 
contrast, over 1996-2005, Toyota restyled its higher-volume lines more frequently than its lower-
volume lines.  Whereas Chevrolet restyled only one model with an annual volume of at least 
100,000 units (Corsica/Malibu) more than once, Toyota restyled every model with the same unit 
minimum twice.  Toyota restyled its lower-volume lines (Tercel/Echo, Celica) only once.          
What could the Detroit Three do to halt decline of the market share? The results of our 
analysis suggest that the domestics’ most potent weapon is to increase the level of styling 
activity, focusing on the higher-volume lines.  The recent increase in the pace of styling activity 
and the pruning of models by domestic manufacturers are moves in the right direction.  
Importantly, Nakata, Im, Park, and Ha (2006) report that the most important determinant of a 
successful new product launch is the proficiency of the team charged with that task.  Also 
positive is the post-2006 decision by domestic manufacturers to strengthen their warranty terms. 
Furthermore, domestic manufacturers should not be so quick to jettison established vehicle line 
names, as rebranding has an adverse market share impact.  Finally, they should devote fewer   17
resources to safety appliances, as we find no evidence that being on the “safety frontier” has had 
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 Table 1: Data Summary  
 







Price, $  U.S. Japan  Korea  Europe 
1996 131  9.7  69% 26% 1%  4%  19,498 
1997 137  11.1  69% 26% 1%  4%  20,084 
1998 137  10.9  67% 27% 1%  4%  20,579 
1999 135  11.3  68% 26% 2%  5%  21,052 
2000 142  12.9  63% 28% 3%  6%  21,309 
2001 152  12.0  60% 29% 4%  7%  21,556 
2002 155  12.8  60% 30% 4%  6%  21,488 
2003 155  12.5  57% 32% 4%  6%  21,424 
2004 161  12.1  55% 34% 5%  6%  22,507 
2005 157  11.6  54% 37% 5%  4%  22,497 
2006 152  10.3  49% 40% 5%  7%  23,180 
 
 



















l. Up  Down  Adopt.  Delet. 
1996 17  3  0  0  22  18  15  1  4  4.3 
1997 25  7  0  0  29  17  84  0  3  5.2 
1998 23 16  0  0  14  31  18  0  5  5.9 
1999 22  3  0  0  24  22  8  1  7  5.8 
2000 24 18  7  0  27  32  15  1  5  7.0 
2001 26 24  10  0  20  24  15  0  3  6.3 
2002 22 14  17  0  26  25  13  1  4  6.0 
2003 20 18  23  3  30  44  34  19  6  6.8 
2004 23 24  1  0  41  18  17  2  7  7.7 
2005 28 26  3  0  25  30  25  1  7  7.7 
2006 28 13  14  15  26  35  30  0  10  6.0   20
Table 2: Explaining Market Share Growth: Pooled Results 
   Pooled Cars  Trucks 
Constant  -9.17*** -9.53***  -7.2*** 
(1.58) (2.09)  (2.43) 
Advertising  0.15*** 0.15***  0.14*** 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) 
Price  -0.21 -0.38*  0.05 
(0.15) (0.20)  (0.22) 
Model Year Length  0.68*** 0.76***  0.59*** 
(0.03) (0.05)  (0.05) 
Number of Competitors  -0.28*** 0.02  -0.42*** 
(0.07) (0.12)  (0.09) 
Reliability/Quality  0.02 0.07***  -0.01 
(0.02) (0.03)  (0.02) 
Partial Restyling  10.71*** 10.33***  11.62*** 
(2.85) (3.82)  (4.36) 
Complete Restyling  19.78*** 23.43***  11.95** 
(3.42) (4.61)  (5.07) 
Name Change  -2.30 -5.85  1.14 
(6.78) (8.88)  (10.53) 
Rebates  -0.74 0.38  -2.91 
(1.92) (2.64)  (2.82) 
Interest Rate Subvention  -5.16 -5.24  -4.74 
(3.39) (4.29)  (5.62) 
Safety Appliance 
Adoption 
-4.95 -2.17  -13.25 
(4.37) (5.07)  (9.92) 
Safety Appliance Deletion -7.64 -12.22  -0.57 
(6.53) (8.57)  (10.06) 
Warranty Improvement  3.25 3.48  2.62 
(3.88) (5.45)  (5.37) 
Warranty Curtailment  -24.88*** -34.96**  -21.48*** 
(8.12) (18.14)  (8.66) 
Lagged Partial Restyling  0.53 -1.19  2.79 
(2.79) (3.75)  (4.14) 
Lagged Complete 
Restyling 
19.91*** 20.47***  18.95*** 
(2.81) (3.73)  (4.25) 
Lagged Name Change  -5.21 -4.92  -7.81 
(5.09) (6.68)  (7.92) 
N  1214 717  497 
R2adj  42% 45%  38% 
DW  2.26 2.21  2.26 
Hausman  0.30 0.14  0.58 
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Table 3: Explaining Market Share Growth: Countries 
  
Country 
USA Japan  Korea  Europe 
Constant  -11.27*** -8.81***  -8.60  -5.55 
(2.37)  (2.70) (13.74) (4.05) 
Advertising  0.19***  0.13*** 0.19*** 0.09*** 
(0.02)  (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) 
Price  -0.12 -0.5*  0.90  0.02 
(0.19)  (0.29) (0.97) (0.47) 
Model Year Length  0.61***  0.67*** 0.72*** 0.92*** 
(0.04)  (0.07) (0.19) (0.10) 
Number of Competitors  -0.2** -0.38***  -0.33  -0.02 
(0.10)  (0.12) (0.46) (0.25) 
Reliability/Quality  0.00 0.04  0.13  0.12** 
(0.02)  (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) 
Partial Restyling  15.31*** 10.47**  -1.87  8.90 
(3.96)  (5.00) (15.02) (9.06) 
Complete Restyling  18.21*** 19.81***  -3.03  33.86*** 
(4.91)  (6.27) (17.49) (9.33) 
Name Change  -23.68*** 17.11  -  19.83 
(8.84) (13.42)    (17.84) 
Rebates  2.08 -4.54  8.44  -4.60 
(2.61)  (4.25) (13.75) (7.42) 
Interest Rate Subvention  0.03 -6.58  -7.38  -11.33* 
(5.52)  (6.32) (18.58) (6.74) 
Safety Appliance 
Adoption 
-5.11 -7.25  -  0.63 
(8.85) (7.57)    (7.55) 
Safety Appliance 
Deletion 
-6.61 -16.24  -  - 
(6.18) (32.64)     
Warranty Improvement  -0.95  2.08 27.90 7.49 
(4.81) (7.92)  (20.23)  (13.93) 
Warranty Curtailment  -20.06*** -52.94**  -  - 
(8.06) (24.04)     
Lagged Partial Restyling  3.63 3.40  -10.73  -15.02* 
(3.87)  (4.93) (15.19) (8.50) 
Lagged Complete 
Restyling 
14.54***  22.44*** 38.88** 21.51*** 
(3.82)  (5.09) (18.00) (7.71) 
Lagged Name Change  5.55 -14.29 - -20.69 
(6.35) (10.39)    (13.30) 
N  622  395 54 143 
R2adj  44%  35% 44% 56% 
DW  2.36  2.16 1.96 2.10 
Hausman  1.45  1.28 2.72* 1.08 
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Table 4: Explaining Market Share Growth: Manufacturer 
  
Make 
GM Ford  Chrysler Toyota  Honda  Nissan  SmlJap Europe
Constant  -12.18*** -16.42*** -4.82  -11.08** -6.21  -12.53**  0.60  -5.55 
(2.92) (5.81) (5.31) (4.72)  (5.21) (5.78) (7.17) (4.05) 
Advertising  0.19*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.25***  0.04  0.08* 0.11**  0.09***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Price  -0.13 -0.54 0.48  0.58 -0.95  -0.80  -0.69  0.02 
(0.25) (0.42) (0.48) (0.66)  (0.76) (0.58) (0.66) (0.47) 
Model Year 
Length 
0.5***  0.62*** 0.82*** 0.77***  0.54*** 1.02***  0.54*** 0.92***
(0.05) (0.09) (0.11) (0.15)  (0.17) (0.15) (0.20) (0.10) 
Number of 
Competitors 
-0.11 -0.14  -0.51*** -0.24  -0.8*** 0.10  -0.06  -0.02 
(0.15) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19)  (0.25) (0.41) (0.25) (0.25) 
Reliability/Quali
ty 
0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.15  0.09  0.31  0.10  0.12** 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.14)  (0.25) (0.28) (0.15) (0.05) 
Partial Restyling  9.29* 24.78*** 36.93*** 16.36*  9.83  18.59 -1.21  8.90 
(5.51)  (6.72) (10.39) (8.65)  (13.31) (12.32) (10.52) (9.06) 
Complete 
Restyling 
12.21* 31.13*** 4.74  14.83 34.88*** 8.56  36.18*  33.86***
(7.17) (10.30) (9.39) (11.76)  (10.75) (15.14) (20.22) (9.33) 
Name Change  -15.90 -40.64** 34.34  -  -39.82  8.87  28.20  19.83 
(11.27) (19.35) (28.86)    (36.35)  (27.65)  (29.86) (17.84) 
Rebates  4.35 -1.18 -2.16 1.70 0.24  8.21  -15.84  -4.60 
(3.38) (6.20) (5.87) (7.14)  (14.64) (10.63) (10.07) (7.42) 
Interest Rate 
Subvention 
-7.11 20.66** 4.34  -5.71  -3.39 -4.89  -14.54  -11.33* 
(7.26)  (10.08) (19.24) (14.88)  (22.68) (12.30) (11.68) (6.74) 
Safety Appliance 
Adoption 
0.67 -47.5*  -30.03  -20.32** -38.54* 7.30  16.12  0.63 
(10.38) (27.26) (28.49)  (9.99) (19.78) (19.05) (21.77) (7.55) 
Safety Appliance 
Deletion 
-10.56 39.67 34.59 -20.27  -  -  -  - 
(6.83)  (27.37) (28.88) (29.87)         
Warranty 
Improvement 
1.82 21.44 -6.34  -  -1.20  -  3.49  7.49 
(10.16) (25.98)  (6.37)    (11.11)    (14.80) (13.93) 
Warranty 
Curtailment 
-25.24 - -26*** -  -  -  -  - 
(20.56)   (8.62)           
Lagged Partial 
Restyling 
2.56 10.97* 0.54  11.21  10.93  -3.59  -4.78  -15.02* 




17.68*** 13.95*  21.8***  31.15*** 20.08** 17.03  2.68 21.51***
(5.35) (7.70) (7.40) (7.94)  (10.23) (10.96) (16.10) (7.71) 
Lagged Name 
Change 
11.68 -28.04*  0.10  -9.66 -28.87  -18.38  1.91 -20.69 
(8.08)  (16.14) (14.65) (21.47)  (23.05) (21.10) (22.01) (13.30) 
N  375 139 133 112 82 81  95  143 
R2adj  36% 52% 59% 47%  31%  47%  28%  56% 
DW  2.44 1.86 2.45 1.74  2.24  1.86  2.25  2.10 
Hausman  0.43 0.74 0.57 1.97  0.23  0.00  0.22  0.35   23













Constant  -12.09***  -3.53 -7.39 -6.04  -5.43*  -2.74 
(2.79)  (4.05) (5.22) (4.78) (3.12)  (5.71) 
Advertising  0.09*** 0.24***  0.17***  0.06* 0.2***  0.13*** 
(0.02)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.04) 
Price  -0.52* -0.33  -0.55  0.45  -0.15  -0.34 
(0.32)  (0.37) (0.41) (0.33) (0.36)  (0.49) 
Model Year Length  0.82***  0.67*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.63***  0.37*** 
(0.07)  (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07)  (0.12) 
Number of 
Competitors 
0.01 0.18  -0.08  -0.54**  -0.59*** 0.31 
(0.19)  (0.24) (0.24) (0.22) (0.10)  (0.23) 
Reliability/Quality  0.07* 0.11***  0.05 -0.01 -0.03  -0.09 
(0.04)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.09) 
Partial Restyling  13.88** 14.49*** -2.03  5.86  6.40 20.95* 
(6.31)  (5.82) (8.58) (8.81) (5.19)  (11.64) 
Complete Restyling  36.69*** 8.85  16.92*  12.01 7.37  18.13 
(7.54)  (7.87) (9.49) (8.60) (7.44)  (12.13) 
Name Change  7.98 -30.18**  -20.67  -39.86  7.29  10.86 
(13.36)  (15.61) (19.45) (28.40) (13.04)  (22.56) 
Rebates  -3.04 -5.93  4.82  4.14  -5.41  -15.23** 
(5.23)  (4.37) (6.00) (5.33) (3.69)  (6.44) 
Interest Rate 
Subvention 
-10.66* -9.63  13.52  -18.78*  0.76  -9.68 
(6.29)  (7.41)  (9.81) (10.40) (6.31)  (23.21) 
Safety Appliance 
Adoption 
-1.62 3.82  18.33 - -8.01  -13.36 
(5.84) (15.33)  (19.98)    (11.64)  (18.35) 
Safety Appliance 
Deletion 
-  -3.62 -38.17*  -15.88 -28.65  21.52 
  (9.37)  (21.24) (19.87) (24.68)  (14.62) 
Warranty 
Improvement 
1.89  4.73 -2.04 1.73 -0.96  18.99 
(9.90)  (8.11) (11.69)  (11.73) (6.57)  (12.64) 
Warranty 
Curtailment 
- -32.58*  -  -20.42  -25.34*** 36.77 
 (17.67)    (19.89)  (9.42)  (27.44) 
Lagged Partial 
Restyling 
-3.54  0.16 0.89 8.40 3.87  -9.55 
(6.13)  (5.60) (8.73) (9.16) (4.93)  (10.52) 
Lagged Complete 
Restyling 
14.4***  16.93*** 26.9*** 20.85*** 12.31**  13.65 
(5.84)  (6.19) (8.01) (7.70) (5.99)  (9.97) 
Lagged Name Change  -8.62 10.17  -20.87  4.50  2.39  -4.50 
(9.63)  (11.24) (16.88) (16.42) (12.37)  (14.96) 
N  278  276 163 166 208  123 
R2adj  45%  50% 42% 38% 56%  25% 
DW  2.14  2.33 2.08 2.21 2.29  2.32 
Hausman  0.71  0.24 0.35 0.83 0.23  0.08 